# VULNERABILITIES BY ANALOGY

Why is a raven like a writing desk?

## What am I doing?

- I'm going to explain common attack and exploitation techniques, through my power of analogy!
- There are some great common parallels between computer security and the real world
- I will gently guide you from the real world into a high-level technical understanding
- Goal: Lay the groundwork of understanding attacks and vulnerabilities for future
- We will also talk about some of the common standards and groupings of threats, vulnerabilities, weaknesses, and attack patterns (OWASP, CWE, CAPEC, etc.)

# VULNERABILITIES

the failures

# INJECTION FLAWS

Humans + code = sadness

### Pizza Robot



Goal:

- Deliver pizza
- Greet human
- Return to pizzeria

### Process

- 1. Human goes to a website
- 2. Makes their order
- 3. Enters their name "Joe"
- 4. The pizza is made and placed in delivery robot
- 5. Delivery robot is programmed with commands to get to the house
- 6. Delivery robot delivers pizza and says "Greetings, Joe"
- 7. Delivery robot returns to base

Forward: 50 ft Turn: Right Forward: 300 ft Turn: Left Forward: 10 ft Turn: Left Forward: 5 ft Greet: **Deliver:** Pizza Return



## Hijacking a Pizza Robot

Forward: 50 ft Turn: Right Forward: 300 ft Turn: Left Forward: 10 ft Turn: Left Forward: 5 ft Greet: **Deliver:** Pizza Return

Expected: Joe Unexpected: Joe Turn: Left Forward: 1 ft Forward: 1 ft

Forward: 50 ft Turn: Right Forward: 300 ft Turn: Left Forward: 10 ft Turn: Left Forward: 5 ft Greet: Joe Turn: Left Forward: 1 ft Turn: Left Forward: 1 ft **Deliver:** Pizza Return

## What's happening!?

- Everything in White is "Code" programmer supplied
  - Code is simply special text that tells a system what to do
  - GPS for a computer
- Everything in Red is "Data" user supplied
  - Data is anything else: text, photos, etc.
- The programmer assumed the name would not include "Code"
  - Nobody's named "Turn" or "Forward" right?
- When the user supplied those things the robot wrongly interpreted them as "Code"
- This is fundamentally the same thing that happens in XSS, SQLi, Buffer Overflows, XML injection, and more!

Forward: 50 ft Turn: Right Forward: 300 ft Turn: Left Forward: 10 ft Turn: Left Forward: 5 ft Greet: Joe Turn: Left Forward: 1 ft Turn: Left Forward: 1 ft **Deliver:** Pizza Return


XSS & SQLI

Time to get real


# Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

Mixing Code and Data using control characters in the webpage

- Try this anywhere you control a value on the page
  - HTML
  - JavaScript
  - Headers
- How is your input being encoded?
- Test Cases
  - Change your input
  - Try <marquee>
  - Try <script>alert('XSS')</script>



loginError.action?errorMsg=Sorry%2C+incorrect+username+or+password.



loginError.action?errorMsg=

</div><h1>Login Moved</h1>Please Login at: http://evilportal.com LOG IN

#### TO SHADOW BANK

#### **Login Moved**

Please Login at: http://evilportal.com

Username

Password

LOG IN

loginError.action?errorMsg=

<marquee>




loginError.action?errorMsg=

<script>document.location='http://evilhacker.o rg'</script>

#### Outlook<sup>-</sup>Web App

Your session has timed out. To protect your account from unauthorized access, the connection to your mailbox is closed after a period of inactivity. Please re-enter your user name and password.

#### Security (show explanation)





Whenever a page includes unsanitized user input

#### <html>

<body>

```
<h1>Welcome to Cat Search!</h1>
We help you find images of all your kitty needs!
```

Search:

#### <form>

```
<input type='text' placeholder='search cats'></input>
<input type=loubmit! volue="Search"</pre>
```

<input type='submit' value="Search">

</form>

- </body>
- </html>

#### Welcome to Cat Search!

☆ =

We help you find images of all your kitty needs!

#### Search:

000/

+ > C 2

```
search cats Search
```

Уĸ

#### <html>

```
<body>
```

```
<h1>Welcome to Cat Search!</h1>
```

```
We help you find images of all your kitty needs!Search:
```

#### <form>

```
<input type='text' placeholder='search cats'></input>
<input type='submit' value="Search">
```

#### </form>

```
<h2>Results for: fluffy</h2>
```

#### 

```
<img src='cat1.jpg'>
<img src='cat2.jpg'>
<img src='cat3.jpg'>
```

```
</body>
```

```
</html>
```

#### www.catsearch.com?search=fluffy

☆ =

#### Welcome to Cat Search!

We help you find images of all your kitty needs!

Search:

fluffy Search

#### **Results: for fluffy**



<html> <body> <h1>Welcome to Cat Search!</h1> We help you find images of all your kitty needs! Search: <form> <input type='text' placeholder='search cats'></input> <input type='submit' value="Search"> </form> <h2>Sorry no results for: sadlfkjsadflkjsdaf</h2> </body> </html>

#### www.catsearch.com?search=sadlfkjsadf... # =

#### Welcome to Cat Search!

We help you find images of all your kitty needs!

Search:

sadlfkjsadflkjsdaf

Search

#### Sorry no results for: sadlfkjsadflkjsdaf

#### <html>

```
<body>
```

```
<h1>Welcome to Cat Search!</h1>
```

We help you find images of all your kitty needs!Search:

<form>

```
<input type='text' placeholder='search cats'></input>
<input type='submit' value="Search">
```

</form>

```
<h2>Sorry no results for: <script>alert('xss')</script></h2>
```

</body>

</html>



# **SQL** Injection

- Mixing Code and Data using control characters in Database Queries
- Try this on any input you think may use the database
  - Textboxes, URL Parameters, dropdowns, hidden fields
- Start small, build more complex SQL Queries to manipulate the database
- Test Cases
  - Does 'Produce an error message?
  - Think about how to manipulate the SQL command

#### SELECT \* FROM USERS WHERE Username = 'joe' AND Password = 'P4S\$WorD1';

Input Values		
Username	joe	
Password	P4S\$WorD1	

Commentary:

Assuming correct username and password the user is logged in

SELECT \* FROM USERS WHERE Username = 'joe' AND Password = 'P4S\$WorD1';

Input Values		
Username	joe'	
Password	P4S\$WorD1	

Commentary:

Errant single quote causes a parsing error. Error returned to user.

#### SELECT \* FROM USERS WHERE Username = 'joe'' AND Password = 'P4S\$WorD1';

com.fjordengineering.store.util.SecureSQLException

Input Values		
Username	joe'#	
Password	P4S\$WorD1	

Commentary:

Password check is commented out. Username is checked and attacker is logged in as 'joe'

#### SELECT \* FROM USERS WHERE Username = 'joe'#' AND Password = 'P4S\$WorD1';

Login Success: User = joe

Input Values		
Username	joe' OR 1=1 #	
Password	P4S\$WorD1	

Commentary:

Password check is commented out. Username is checked and attacker is logged in as 'joe'

#### SELECT \* FROM USERS WHERE Username = 'joe' OR 1=1 #' AND Password = 'P4S\$WorD1';

Everything after the # is disregarded

Input Values	
Username	joe' OR 1=1 #
Password	P4S\$WorD1

SELECT \* FROM USERS

Commentary:

Password check is commented out. Username is checked and attacker is logged in as 'joe'

```
SELECT * FROM USERS
WHERE Username = 'joe' OR TRUE;
```

WHERE Username = 'joe' OR 1=1;

1=1 is always TRUE, so we can replace that

Username	joe' OR 1=1 #
Password	P4S\$WorD1

```
SELECT * FROM USERS
WHERE Username = 'joe' OR 1=1;
```

SELECT \* FROM USERS WHERE Username = '**joe**' OR TRUE;

SELECT \* FROM USERS WHERE TRUE; Commentary:

Password check is commented out. Username is checked and attacker is logged in as 'joe'

Anything OR TRUE is always TRUE

#### Input Values

Usernamejoe' OR 1=1 #PasswordP4S\$WorD1

#### SELECT \* FROM USERS WHERE Username = 'joe' OR 1=1;

SELECT \* FROM USERS WHERE Username = '**joe**' OR TRUE;

#### SELECT \* FROM USERS WHERE TRUE;

#### SELECT \* FROM USERS;

Commentary:

Password check is commented out. Username is checked and attacker is logged in as 'joe'

OR 1=1 # short circuits the entire where clause in this case


# INJECTION FLAWS ALLOW AN ATTACKER TO INJECT THEIR OWN CODE INTO THE PROGRAM



# BROKEN AUTHENTICATION

Check ID at the door





IS A HI-VIS VEST MORE POWERFUL THAN ID?

# FREE MOVIES



will in through the turnstile.

MORE

**ZO** ()

FOR YOU

Become a member within the next 14 days and we'll deduct today's ticket price.

Miller

FOR

Become a

within the 14 days a deduct to ticket priv

EXIT

## ENTRANCE TO THE ZOO

# COLDPLAY?

I wasn't a big fan of Coldplay before I saw them in hi-vis

### **Authentication Issues**

- Many opportunities to make mistakes
  - Not checking credentials properly
  - Not storing credentials properly
  - Not protecting authentication tokens properly
  - Loss of credentials
  - Password reuse
  - Phishing
  - Failure to use 2FA
  - Cookie issues
  - XSS
  - CSRF

...

Verify your users

- Protect their credentials
- Protect credential equivilents

# PRIVILEGE ESCALATION

Can I steal your TV through your shed?



### I want in here

## I can get in here

#### What's in a house?

TV

1

- Computers
- Electronics
- Money

#### What's in a shed?

- Ladders
- Bolt cutters
- Spare keys
- Drills & Saws





### Horizontal vs. Vertical Escalation

- Horizontal Privilege Escalation
  - Allows one user can access another user's data
- Vertical Privilege Escalation
  - Allows a user to increase their privilege level
  - Anonymous -> User
  - User -> Manager
  - Manager -> Administrator

# INFORMATION DISCLOSURE


I bet that guy is in sales, I can tell by his suit

## A guy walks into a bar...



# Computers give away information all the time

- Hackers gather that information and use it against us every day
- Tools and Databases scan and collect this information for easy querying
- Our job is to protect this information



## PARAMETER TAMPERING

Control the *data* Control the *future* 

#### Let's find some deals!

- Peel off the tags from some Wonder Bread
- Apply tags to fancy bread!




ASSIC WHITE

REASSIC WHITE



## ALWAYS BE NICE TO YOUR MILLENNIALS

## Everything a computer does starts with input



Without input a computer will always do the same thing



Input filtering, processing, and blocking sets the stage for everything else

## CONFIGURATION ERRORS

Don't put the locks on the wrong side of the door Doors, Windows, and Locks



Installing a door can be difficult to do securely


 $\widehat{\phantom{a}}$ 

Installing a window so it locks automatically

Don't forget to lock your doors and windows

•••

Did you remember all your doors and windows?



# Many software systems can be configured securely

- Most software systems don't come secure by default
- Insecure use of existing components
  - The door is installed poorly
- Insecure configuration of components
  - The lock is misconfigured
- Insecure defaults are used
  - The lock has a reused key or default keycode

# MAKING SENSE OF SO MANY ISSUES

Grouping by Threat, Weakness, Attack Pattern OWASP, CWE, CAPEC, and More!

#### OWASP Open Web Application Security Project


- Most famous for the OWASP Top 10
- A semi-updated list of the most critical web application security risks
  - 2004
  - 2007
  - 2010
  - 2013
  - 2017
- De-facto standard for basic web application testing

A1:2017- Injection	
A2:2017-Broken Authentication	
A3:2017- Sensitive Data Exposure	
A4:2017-XML External Entities (XXE)	
A5:2017-Broken Access Control	
A6:2017-Security Misconfiguration	
A7:2017- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	
A8:2017- Insecure Deserialization	
A9:2017-Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	
A10:2017- Insufficient Logging & Monitoring	

### CVSS Common Vulnerability Scoring System

- A vulnerability scoring calculator
- Included with all our PRs
- Considers Exploitability and Impact metrics
- Can be extended to Temporal and Environmental Metrics
- Exploitability
  - Attack vector

- Attack complexity
- Privileges Required
- User Interaction
- Scope
- Impact Metrics
  - Confidentiality Impact
  - Integrity Impact
  - Availability Impact



[1]	<u>CWE-119</u>	Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer 73			
[2]	<u>CWE-79</u>	Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')			
[3]	<u>CWE-20</u>	Improper Input Validation			
[4]	<u>CWE-200</u>	Information Exposure			
[5]	CWE-125	Out-of-bounds Read			
[6]	CWE-89	Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')			
[7]	CWE-416	Use After Free	17.94		
[8]	CWE-190	Integer Overflow or Wraparound	17.35		
[9]	CWE-352	CWE-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)	15.54		
[10]	CW <mark>E-22</mark>	Common Weakness Enumeration ted Directory ('Path Traversal')	14.10		
[11]	CWE-78	Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') An enumeration of common software	11.47		
[12]	<u>CWE-787</u>	weaknesses (think flaws or vulnerabilities)	11.08		
[13]	<u>CWE-287</u>	<ul> <li>CWE Top 25: Recently updated in 2019,</li> </ul>	10.78		
[14]	<u>CWE-476</u>	Numethodology changed	9.74		
[15]	<u>CWE-732</u>	IncGreat for mapping to internal toolsCritical Resource	6.33		
[16]	<u>CWE-434</u>	Jn Important reference File with Dangerous Type	5.50		
[17]	<u>CWE-611</u>	Not a test planion of XML External Entity Reference	5.48		
[18]	<u>CWE-94</u>	Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')	5.36		
[19]	<u>CWE-798</u>	Use of Hard-coded Credentials	5.12		
[20]	<u>CWE-400</u>	Uncontrolled Resource Consumption	5.04		
[21]	<u>CWE-772</u>	Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime			
[22]	CWE-426	Untrusted Search Path	4.40		
TO OT			1.00		



- New: Released 2018
- Confusingly named ATT&CK framework
- Focused on enterprise risk (think Attack Sim and Red Teaming)
- Partially maps to our Attack Sim and Red Teaming
- May map to our Cloud CMD+CTRL CyberRanges

#### ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact

#### CAPEC Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification

- An Exhaustive list of every attack possible against any system organized by Domain or Mechanism
- 517 total attack patterns
- Mostly academic
- Great for having a standard language for attacks
- Great for mapping attacks to internal resources
- Not a test plan

30	00 - Domains of Attack
	— 🖻 🖲 Software - (513)
	- M Exploitation of Trusted Credentials - (21)
	—
	- • I Forced Deadlock - (25)
	—  ■  M Leveraging Race Conditions - (26)
	—• 🛛 <u>Fuzzing - (28)</u>
	— 🗉 🕅 Manipulating User State - (74)
	—
	— 🗉 🛙 Brute Force - (112)
	—⊞ Manipulation - (113)
	—
	—
	— 🗉 🖾 Excavation - (116)
	— Interception - (117)
	—
	— I M Buffer Manipulation - (123)
	—• M Shared Data Manipulation - (124)
	— 🗉 🕅 Flooding - (125)
	— • 🖾 Pointer Manipulation - (129)
	—
	- • Resource Leak Exposure - (131)
	- Image: Marameter Injection - (137)
	—⊞ <u>Content Spoofing - (148)</u>
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	—
	- Market Ma
	- Infrastructure Manipulation - (161)
	- I M File Manipulation - (165)
	-B Footprinting - (169)
	- MAction Spoofing - (173)
	- Marine Code Inclusion - (175)
	- Configuration/Environment Manipulation - (176)
	- Software Integrity Attack - (184)
	-EM Reverse Engineering - (188)
	- Image Fingerprinting - (224)
	- M Sustained Client Engagement - (227)
	- IM Privilege Escalation - (233)
	—⊞ Mesource Injection - (240) —⊞ Mcode Injection - (242)
	—⊞ I Command Injection - (242) —⊞II Command Injection - (248)
	—∎ I Protocol Manipulation - (272)
	—⊞ Information Elicitation - (410)
	—∎ Modification During Manufacture - (438)
	—∎ Malicious Logic Insertion - (441)
	- • I Contaminate Resource - (548)
	-IM Functionality Bypass - (554)
	- • Object Injection - (586)
	—⊞ Traffic Injection - (594)
	-EM Obstruction - (607)
	—
	— ■ ● Communications - (512)
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